

Foreign Policy of Pakistan: “Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Era”

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Keywords	Abstract
USSR, USA, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Policy, Pakistan, India, Muslim World, Nuclear War, Third World.	<i>Historically, after independence, the vision of foreign policy of Pakistan was molded under the influence of great powers such as the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1992-1991) (USSR) during the Cold War. It served the security vision of the US across the world. The article orderly postulates the foreign policy vision of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he took charge and showed his aspiration for changes in the foreign policy approach of Pakistan. Those changes had to undermine the power status of the USA. Therefore, the charismatic character of Bhutto led to the confrontation of policy choice between the great powers, the USA and USSR and their allies, and Pakistan. Bhutto aspired for the bloc of developing countries specifically from the Muslim world. He wanted to unite those countries and prevent their exploitation by the major powers. He wanted to excel in the domestic potential of the third world for the sake of a better and sustainable future. Bhutto talked and walked for the security of Pakistan and demanded a nuclear umbrella from the nuclear enemy states like India. So, his aggressive stance could not fit in with the policy approach of the major powers, and he had to sacrifice his government as well as his life.</i>

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is a domain of every country’s engagement across the border at the international level, where every country solely follows the mission of preserving its national interest and portraying a positive face among the member states of the international community. In simple words, it can be defined as dealing with the outside world in various areas of cooperation, such as security, economic interest, and human resource management. As international relations have evolved since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 was signed, which later on specified the scope and conduct of states’ relations and the origin of states’ sovereigntyⁱ. Moreover, the 20th-century major conflicts attracted the attention of the international community, such as World War One (1914-1917), which proved to be one of the grave catastrophic events for the world communities, and since no single state remained to save them from the devastated environment of the warⁱⁱ.

It led to the era of decolonization, and Pakistan emerged on the “third” world map. Since, after its inception, the country faced multi-dimensional threats to its origin, and the founder of Pakistan expressed his aspirations that the country would be run in balanced relations with the eastern and western world. The foreign policy of Pakistan is guided by the vision and principles set by the founding father of the country, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who said that:

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do

not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charterⁱⁱⁱ.

Pakistan served its mutual ties with the Western world from the start of its diplomatic venture, and the United States of America (USA) was one of the major causes of its attention. She was a victorious power and bullied her allies and opponents, the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)”, at that time. It’s “the USA” that changed the overall global scenery of Pakistan’s foreign policy and remained the most influential factor in the foreign policy formulation and consideration by the leadership of that time in Pakistan. The paper enlightens about the foreign policy of Pakistan under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

METHODOLOGY

Initially, the paper provides a historical appraisal of Pakistan’s foreign policy from its independence (1947) till 1969. Moreover, the paper specifically provides a descriptive and analytical account of the period of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s foreign policy as a foreign minister, president and prime minister (1963-1977). After the dismemberment of the country, the charismatic leader of Pakistan emerged with his own self-professed ideas and dimension, which were to take the country into the future. It was a struggle by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to provide Pakistan with a balanced road map of development and national dignity at the international level especially.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Early Years 1947-1965

In border terms, foreign policy remained as a central theme of a process through which Pakistan would choose its national priorities and goals, but certain factors existing at the international level dominated the foreign policy domain of Pakistan, and the decision-makers felt encircled by those prevailing conditions historically. Shortly after the independence of Pakistan, the country faced confusion about choosing either the eastern communist block or the western capitalist block. Ultimately, in favor of situations and national security, Pakistan opted for the United States of America (USA), and the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan made his first visit to the USA in May 1950,^{iv} which formally opened the roadmap of dialogue and understandings between both sides. Though, *ifs* and *buts* were attached to the choice between the USA and the USSR, for Pakistan. On the other side, Pakistan faced three times the stronger enemy “India”, on the eastern border when the issue of Kashmir was unresolved, and in October 1947, the Pak-Indo war started over the issue of Kashmir^v. India also stopped the water flow toward Pakistan. Shortly after the Nehru-Liaquat pact in 1950^{vi}, Pakistan faced the consequence of its decision-making crisis in the Korean War (1950-1951)^{vii} when the USA demanded the Pakistani army, which could be engaged against Chinese-backed forces on the Korean peninsula, but fortunately Pakistan avoided such a sort of approach and remained undecided about jumping into the battlefield between China and the USA. Pakistan, as it ill-afforded its internal power

crisis “political issues”, decided to sign its first mutual assistance defense agreement with the USA in 1954^{viii} and it was based upon the assumption that Pakistan would be the most allied Asian ally of the USA in the future and possibly the implication became exposed to the world when Pakistan signed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization “Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)” in 1955 by the celebration of the USA and its western allies^{ix}. Furthermore, from 1953 till 1963 Pakistan also faced the pressure of the Pashtunistan issue from the western side of the border. Daud had serious reservations over the territorial divide between Pakistan and Afghanistan^x. Moreover, the USSR also backed the issue to increase the pressure so that the access of Pakistan could be short and the expansionist design of the USSR could be met indirectly. The USA had gained control of the small airbase in Peshawar, from where the defensive and aggressive action and reaction of the USSR could be monitored by the USA. Detection of the USA Ariel plane on the territory of the USSR; Pakistan became the primary victim of the incident, which is famous in history with the title of the U-2 incident or crisis in 1958 when the Soviet targeted and shot down the USA drone which was operating from Pakistan “Peshawar” and involved in state-sponsored espionage^{xi}. The Soviet primer threatened Pakistan with serious consequences for what Pakistan had offered to the USA. Early in 1953-54 Pakistan preferred close relations with the USA when Army commander Ayub Khan visited the USA to convince them of the further expansion of mutual defense and economic ventures^{xii}. It was a positive experience of the Pakistan-USA relationship at that time but was unbalanced. Washington was keen to provide assistance and preserve close relations with Pakistan, but the USA was cautious that in case of closing its ties with Pakistan, the USA may lose India when the USSR is adjusting its relations closely to India. India was one of the crucial factors in Pakistan-USA relations. Pakistan needed the active cooperation of the USA to balance its power against India; however, the USA’s anxiety with Indo-Russian relations exposed weak Pak-USA relations later. China was additionally the main factor among the triangular interaction of the USA, Pakistan and India at that time^{xiii}. India kept receiving food and military aid from both sides (USA and USSR), and Pakistan was proven to have close relations with India and the USA. Perhaps Pakistan could not observe the multidimensional engagement of the Indo-Soviet and American affections toward India, or perhaps the prevailing condition did not allow the Pakistan think tank to decide according to their wish when the international conditions were so compelling because of the weak security situation in the region and the persistence of threats from the eastern and western borders of Pakistan. In total sum, Pakistan remained tilted toward the USA. Joining the USA-sponsored alliances from 1954 till 1959, Pakistan received \$522 million worth of assistance from the USA. Also, Pakistan received \$620 million of aid in terms of economic means and development at that time^{xiv}. But relations between Pakistan and the USA could not follow the mutual economic statements from both sides, and the diplomatic effort remained in the vine at many crucial stages in the then present and future. In 1963, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the foreign minister, Pakistan successfully signed a border agreement with China in 1963, which opened the new era of relations between Pakistan and China^{xv} while deepening the rivalry between Pakistan and India when India sent a protest letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that Pakistan favored the aggressor, China^{xvi}. Further, China supported the cause of the war of 1965 in favor of Pakistan and aided after the end of the war, while on the other side the USA provided weapons and defenses assistance to India shortly after the Indo-China conflict in 1962,^{xvii} which once again sharpened the situation against Pakistan in the time then coming. Pakistan faced ignorance from its close ally “the USA” after the war of 1965 and almost faced an embargo when India enjoyed the absence of USA pressure upon them. The war

of 1965 brought sharp swift in the foreign policy of the USA and Ayub's Pakistan, where India seized the opportunity to sit in the lap of the USA^{xviii}. The USA president J. F Kennedy issued a statement regarding Indo-USA relations; the aim was to avoid strain in its relations with Pakistan. The American president stated that.

In providing assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All of the aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion. Chinese insertions into the subcontinent are a threat to Pakistan as well as India, and both have a common interest in opposing it^{xix}.

As Kennedy's India policy had resulted in disturbing the military imbalance in Asia, especially between Pak-Indo, it brought great disadvantage to Pakistan in the shape of strained "deadlock" diplomatic understandings over the foreign objectives. This was the stage when Pakistan turned toward China and extended its diplomatic approach to its own political and material support. On the other side, the Communist USSR was closely observing the deteriorating relations between Pakistan and India-USA understandings. During the Soviet primer's visits to India and Kabul in 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin supported both India and Afghanistan against Pakistan^{xx}. Later, in 1960, the Soviet Ambassador warned Pakistan that *we will keep on supporting India and Afghanistan against you because they are our friends, even when they are wrong. But your friends do not support you even when they know that you (Pakistan) are right^{xxi}*. The Soviet Primer also wanted to stabilize his relationship with Pakistan so that way he could break the diplomatic and military doctrine of the capitalist bloc up to that level to create a diplomatic gap.

The newly emerged layer of friendship between Pakistan and China was further strengthened when China signed an economic deal with Pakistan where Pakistan would have free access to the Chinese market, and it was the very first agreement between Communist China and any other non-communist country^{xxii}. Through this agreement, the Chinese could have had access to the African countries and Arab countries for the purpose of trade, and it was also an easy and safe option for the Chinese to promote the trade on these routes. Consequently, it strongly pushed back the USA anxiety and unhappiness in the minds of the USA think tanks who were much concerned about Pak-China relations. Apparently, the USA suspended loans for Pakistan while losing the patience further, Pakistan also had to face a ban on military aid. Pakistan could not build consensus with the USA to convince them about the nature of its relationship with China. President Ayub warned publicly that with the policy of continuous American assistance to India, the smaller countries in the area would look for protection from somewhere else^{xxiii}. It was after the border clash between Sino and India. Further, President Ayub Khan declared that now Pakistan may not be in the position to contribute to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) because the attitude of the USA is as if they would never hesitate to let down their friends, and today, their policy is based upon greed and opportunities. Moreover, in 1963 the USA stated that in aiding India we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All the aid to India is for the purpose of defeating communist subversion^{xxiv}. But the USA could not convince Ayub Khan and as Ayub Khan suggested to America, *it is right as an independent nation to normalize our relations with our neighbors, however, the difference of ideologies might exist, but we cannot remain in the same position for the sake of our ideologies when it is necessary for us to move across the contradiction toward cooperation^{xxv}*.

Shortly after the war, when the USA put an arms embargo on South Asia, it hurt Pakistan more than India. Also, India claimed that Pakistan showed the double standard in its relations with the USA while using those weapons against us which were given to them for the purpose of tackling the threat from the communist manifesto in South Asia. When Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was informed about the USA suspension of weapons against Pakistan, he reacted in bold words and said that *we have discussed problems in the past but not now anymore; Pakistan will fight with hands if necessary but will never surrender. I am ready to fight for a thousand years. To cut off the supply in hours is no way to respect your ally*^{xxvi}. In this regard, Pakistan remained successful in owning the support of China in this regard and issued a statement on neutral bases. Bhutto blamed India as an aggressor at the back of [USSR] support. Finally, the USSR offered a neutral solution to the Pak-Indo conflict because the Soviets had calculated that in case of Pakistan being back by China in the war against the USA-backed India, then the Soviet may lose Pakistan completely to the domination of the USA. Pakistan and India signed the Tashkent Declaration in 1967^{xxvii} through the mechanism promoted by the USSR good office diplomacy.

To encapsulate the whole era since independence Pakistan's foreign policy revolved around the central theme of the great powers' (The USA and USSR) approach. An excessive amount of dependency upon the USA for the national existence of Pakistan remains short of finding a creative standpoint to promote their mutual interest in the next era. China emerged as a trustworthy neighbor of Pakistan, but unfortunately, Pakistan had to pay the price of relations with China in the shape of crucial diplomatic relations with the USA. As both Pakistan and the USA were receiving each other with passive means of engagement for all the times. Further, the anxiety of the USSR and much-needed support by China to Pakistan did not clarify the grounds of the future for both Pakistan and USSR relations. The USSR offer at Tashkent was an opportunistic approach to neutralize the role of the USA. The then prevailing conditions and the aspirations of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto brought some radical changes to the foreign policy dimension of Pakistan.

Bhutto's Foreign Policy: A Paradigm Shift

One cannot deny that all the past alliances for the purpose of national security failed to guarantee Pakistan's integrity in the region. Mr. Bhutto took over the ideas and followed the neutral and balanced approach across the world and retaliated to the Kashmir issue with India while ignoring the claims of Kabul about Pakhtunistan. He responded to the reactionary approach of the USSR and the bias attitude of the United States of America (USA), which was time and again tested in previous wars with India and in relations with China. He aspired to provide a better road map to Pakistan with a positive face across the international world and transform the one-sided dependency with a wide level of diversified engagement across the states from the Muslim and non-Muslim world, especially the great powers. In 1973 emphasizing upon the balanced relationship across the world, he stated that injustice breeds conflicts and is a great impediment to peace^{xxviii}.

Bhutto's Approach toward the Muslim World and China: Till 1970 the foreign policy of Pakistan was observed to be contradictory by the USA, and after some time Bhutto brought big changes to foreign policy, especially with big powers. The 1971 war with India was quite determinative in this regard when the USA became closer to India, which China favored Pakistan's stance was because China never wanted Pakistan to be vulnerable against the pressure

of the USA and India. There were also some sources saying that in between 1971 up to 1974 China had supplied 300 million worth of military equipment. Also, after the 1974 nuclear blasts by India, China remained committed to boosting Pakistan's defense budget^{xxxix}. China remained short of intervention into 1971 because it could lead to Russian involvement on behalf of India, so China preferred to stay aside and emphasise the solution of Pak-Indo bilateral issues. China had to maintain the balance of power in the region while standing behind the stance of Pakistan on many occasions. Pakistan was always under threat from arch-rival India. Furthermore, after the fall of Dhaka, Pakistan established reciprocal relations with the Muslim world, and Bhutto was committed to the diplomatic initiative with a united approach to the Middle East. Bhutto visited many Muslim countries for the purpose of moral, political and diplomatic support. Pakistan gave material and moral support to the Arab world conflict with Israel. Moreover, the Islamic Summit in Lahore (1974) was declared a great victory for Bhutto when great world leaders attended the conference in Pakistan^{xxx}.

Simultaneously, Pakistan improved its relationship with the Muslim world when Bhutto visited Afghanistan in 1972 to moderate Pak-Afghan understandings over the mutual conflicts, and later in 1976 King Daud visited Pakistan while agreeing to advance mutual interactions over the prevailing issues between both countries^{xxxi}. During this time period of Pakistan and Afghanistan diplomatic deadlock, both sides have supported proxies against each other. The insurgent's movements at the border area of both countries were the main tool or backdoor engagement by either side to counter its opponents. According to the estimate, the Afghan government spent 875,000 dollars per year on Pakhtun and Baloch insurgents to create resistance at the border areas^{xxxii}. Bhutto establishes a special cell for Afghanistan to keep its role in the affairs of Afghanistan because Pakistan had stakes to support the Southern Alliance against the Northern in Afghanistan. The primary purpose of covert support was to assure its deep state interest in Afghanistan and avoid any belligerent regime in Kabul which may prove liable for Pakistan. Although the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained on the basis of stretching each other's backs in active and passive ways till the movement when Bhutto's regime was toppled down by Zia Ul-Haq in 1977^{xxxiii}.

More, In 1972 Bhutto visited Iran, Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. Extending its relations further, he visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Somalia^{xxxiv}. The primary aim was to establish direct and indirect relations among Muslim countries, which could be better for Pakistan. Pakistani nationalism was an important factor for inter-Arab disputes. Bhutto openly supported the cause of Palestine at world forums. Pakistan, avoiding becoming a bond of contention among conflicts between the Muslim countries, cooperated militarily with other Islamic states. From 1972 to 1977 Pakistan concluded a military protocol with Iraq, supporting covert activities of Arabs in the war of 1973 against Israel^{xxxv}. Consequently, Muslim states became closer to Pakistan for exports, increasing the cross-cultural cooperation among Muslim countries. In Pakistan, the teaching of Arab world languages was promoted. The plan with Saudi Arabia to build King Faisal Mosque was finalized and Saudi Arabia also funded Pakistan in the crucial time when Bhutto was stuck to his nuclear diplomacy against the wishes of great powers. In the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference, Bhutto spoke bravely that *we, the people of Pakistan, shall give our blood for the cause of Islam, the people of Pakistan are soldiers of Isla;, and its armies are the armies of Islam*^{xxxvi}. Pakistan Participated in the first session of the new Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs in 1977. Bhutto's promotions of the Joint Minister Commission

among the Islamic countries also encouraged his policy of bilateralism, though which he wanted to deal with its relations with prominent Muslim countries like Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

In a nutshell, Bhutto as a leader among the Islamic countries wanted to build a framework of political and economic cooperation to promote Muslim unity. The Muslim leaders agreed to increase their exports and Islamic solidarity funds. The primary aspiration of political and economic engineering among the Muslim countries was to establish a solid and sovereign visionary order of the Muslim world especially and developing countries in general.

Bhutto's Understandings toward the Non-Muslim World: India and Great Powers (The USA and USSR)

Aggressive Bhutto Confronting Hostile India: Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali died in 1963, and Bhutto was named as a foreign minister of the Ayub Cabinet^{xxxvii}. It was the time when the USA was in close cooperation with India in the aftermath of the Indo-China border conflict in 1962. Ayub had a dependence upon Bhutto to carry on the new foreign policy while confronting and dealing with the Indian subversion in South Asia. Pakistan calculated the gestures of India that in case of close cooperation between Pakistan and China, India may not be able to show courage for a great level of military engagement against Pakistan. Particularly, the 1965 war realized the geographical isolation was a vulnerability of the eastern wing of the then Pakistan^{xxxviii}. The cooperation from the Muslim world compelled the Indian prime minister to say that India is standing isolated^{xxxix}.

After the war of 1965, Bhutto joined his Indian counterpart at the table with the cooperation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Tashkent declaration in 1967 was an accord which created the possibility for future cooperation between both states to avoid further confrontations and realized that in case of any additional military conflict, there are chances that both countries would lose control over the solution of bilateral issues and will have to bear the imposition of the UN. The Kashmir cause and the war of 1971 proved to be the crucial determiners of Pakistan and India's relations with each other. Bhutto stated that India should know beyond doubt that Kashmir is to Pakistan what Berlin is to the West and the people of Pakistan will never compromise over the Kashmir cause^{xl}. Consequently, after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, "Emergence of Bangladesh", once again the mutual anxiety and poor understandings were exhausted on the table in the shape of the Simla Treaty in 1972^{xli}. Since Pakistan was dismembered, historically, it was considered a victory for Bhutto to negotiate with India over the issue of prisoners of war and border settlement. In 1974 the nuclear blasts by India, *Smiling Buddha*^{xlii} posed an additional threat to Pakistan's dilemma to establish stable relations between both states. This time Bhutto's Pakistan remained under the favor of China's pressure against India. Bhutto realized that now the nuclear weapons are indispensable against India to sustain our national existence and assure our national security. The blasts by India set off an active diplomatic initiative from the Pakistan side and Bhutto. At the summit of the OIC in 1974, he emphasized the subject of security for the nonnuclear countries from the aggressive designs of nuclear countries. India was the most recent example against the facts of the historical scenario. In the year 1976, Pakistan sponsored a UN resolution in the United Nations in which the security guarantee demanded the peaceful existence of nonnuclear countries^{xliii}. Also, he criticized the Indian hegemonic political and military behavior in South Asia. He (Bhutto) talked about the nuclear-free zone in South Asia^{xliv} and sent his mission to seek a nuclear umbrella from

Washington and Beijing for Pakistan to deter the possible threat from the nuclear states “India”. Hence, Bhutto’s approach against India was more aggressive and based upon the possible options from realists and idealists’ perspectives. He was on his toe to stop India and convince major powers that peace without equality between India and Pakistan is not possible in South Asia. For that matter, on the one side, he proposed Chinese to bring support to Pakistan where India Military posture can be contained on the other side; he dearly faced Indian aggressive design despite the fact of defeat and humiliation in the war of 1971. Aggressively, in 1971, he stated that the thought restraints are there after the defeat, but it is not the end of the war; in fact, it is the start of the war and India should know that we will keep fighting for the honor and dignity of Pakistan^{xliv}.

The US cooperation with India against possible aggression from China and Pakistan’s cooperation with China in order to contain India’s threats and balance its relations with the USA remained around the central themes of Bhutto’s India foreign policy.

Bhutto’s Response to the USA and USSR of the Cold War: The poor understandings between the USA and USSR over the nuclear proliferation affected Pakistan’s relations across both sides. Bhutto’s socialist sentiments, which were pro-communism, not anti-capitalist block, had to bring serious precautions from Pakistan in general and to Bhutto in particular. Though, Bhutto at the same time was in favor of balanced relations with both sides. Applying his vision of bilateralism over Pakistan, he was oversighted by both powers and looked under the layers of suspense. Bhutto’s solid stance of the nuclear development without the convenience of the USA and the revival of normalization with the USSR were the major points of fission toward unstable relations and a lack of trust with the respective powers.

Initially, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger took advantage of Pakistan’s close understandings with China through secret contacts, and resultantly, in 1971, Kissinger visited China from Pakistan^{xlvi}. It proved a solid step in the USA-China relationship normalization. But later on, the USA president Carter did not like Bhutto’s socialist economic models and tightened the embargo against Pakistan in 1976-77^{xlvi}. Further Bhutto’s sympathetic foreign policy toward the USSR was irritating the USA when he was intended to provide a bridge to the USSR to access the warm water, which was something the USA never wanted at any cost. The USA calculated that she might have lost her ally in the Cold War when Pakistan was looking for normal relations with the USSR. Bhutto’s nuclear diplomacy against the possible threat of India was completely rejected by the USA, and additionally, the USA did not show any convenience in providing a guarantee of containing Indian aggression against Pakistan. This certain crisis became the bone of contention between Pakistan and the USA. Bhutto’s quest to have nuclear technology and offering the French government to construct a civil nuclear plant in Pakistan was the end point of diplomacy between Bhutto and the USA when, at the next step, the USA president threatened Bhutto to stop seeking nuclear weapons, saying, ‘otherwise, you can be the sign of a horrible example for a later time.’ Responding to the USA pressure, Bhutto followed his aspirations and finally paid the price in the shape of his life and regime, which is still under the file of uncertainties to conclude the fate of Bhutto and his government. Although, he remained successful on many occasions, like when he visited the USA in 1975, the USA lifted the embargo on Pakistan, and some army ammunition and spare parts were imported^{xlvi}.

Resetting his foreign policy toward the USSR after the misunderstandings of the 1971 tragedy, Bhutto visited the USSR in 1972 and engaged in a discussion over the areas of cooperation in diverse fields. He reconciled the Soviet leadership to invest in the industrial sector and general economic relationship^{xlix}. It could lead to lessening dependence upon the USA by Pakistan. Consequently, trade volume increased. The Soviet did agree to build a steel mill in Pakistan. Pakistan's official departure from SEATO and CENTO in the 1970s was crucial in Pak-USSR relations. The visits to the USSR brought a deal regarding arms between the USSR and Pakistan. Visiting the USSR Mr. Bhutto met the Soviet premier and was told that the USSR must trust Pakistan. In 1973 a Soviet delegation visited Islamabad and signed the trade package, turning over 12.4 million dollars. In the next year, 160 million rubles for the Karachi Steel Mill were signed in 1974. In 1975 the USSR entered into an annual program of exchange of expertise in the different department for the development. Bhutto's policy of nationalization and tilt toward socialism was the major point of bilateral progress between Pakistan and the USSR¹.

Hence, from 1973 till 1977 Pakistan and the USSR enjoyed close relations with each other, but uprisings started after the election of 1977, and the US covertly supported resistance against Bhutto. Unfortunately, Bhutto's struggle led toward the loss of his life. So far, the mutual rivalry between the great powers has brought heavy and disastrous consequences for the small states, and Pakistan has suffered.

CONCLUSION

Convincingly, Mr. Bhutto aspired for the mission to provide his greater services to the Muslim world and Pakistan. The Muslim world leadership felt surprised over the loss of Bhutto in Pakistan because he was one of the great moderators of constructive development across the world. A man who was on the road map to avoid the Muslim world from further victimization and applying his brave diplomatic skills to sponsor mutual understandings of the Muslim world. He brought important changes into the diplomatic and political approach of the Muslim world while raising the hope of betterment in the rest of the developing world. From a national perspective, he promoted the bridge of development among great powers and also benefited from his relations with countries like the USA and USSR when China was already very close to Pakistan. His nuclear diplomacy had primary motives to put restraints against the futurist vision of India, while on the other hand, he was active for the alliances between friends of Pakistan, whereas South Asia was dreamt of as a nuclear-free shield by Bhutto. He was well versed in contemporary politics and its legal domains. He talked about peace, development and human rights at the international level. Also, non-nuclear states' security was one of his major priorities. He was of the view that Pakistan is surrounded by important countries like India and Afghanistan^{li}. But unfortunately, the diversified nature of misunderstandings between great powers, the hegemonic behavior of India, and the biases of the rest of the West in observing Pakistan and India did not allow him to manage his diplomatic channels and sustain a balanced futuristic vision. He could not bring balance to his relations across the world nor systematized and institutionalized his understandings at internal and external forums.

The fatalistic historians believe that history makes the man, but Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was one such person who made history by challenging the world order during a prolonged struggle.

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Endnotes

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- ⁱ (Croxtton 1 Dec 2010.) ⁱⁱ (Becker 2015) ⁱⁱⁱ (D. R. Khan 2015)
- ^{iv} (Mansoor Akbar Kundi & Manzoor Khan Afridi 2018)
- ^v (Mohammad Zubair Iqbal and Shabir Hussain 2018) ^{vi} (Raghavan 2016) ^{vii} (James F. Schnabel & Robert J. Watson 1998)
- ^{viii} (Chaudhry 2018)
- ^{ix} (Ibid 2018) ^x (Rutting 2013)
- ^{xi} (Dar 2018)
- ^{xii} (Dawn.com 2012)
- ^{xiii} (Saeeda Sultana, Syed Khawaja Alqama, & Muhammad Farooq, PhD 2013) ^{xiv} (Ibid 2013) ^{xv} (P. I. Cheema 1986)
- ^{xvi} (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Speeches and Interviews 1948-1966 n.d.) ^{xvii} (Lidarev 2012)
- ^{xviii} (Soherwordi, US Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 & 1971 Pak-India Wars 2010) ^{xix} (Ibid 2010) ^{xx} (H.-u.-R. Khan 1961)
- ^{xxi} (Soherwordi, US Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 & 1971 Pak-India Wars 2010) ^{xxii} (Vertzberger 1983) ^{xxiii} (Dobell 1964)
- ^{xxiv} (Soherwordi, US Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 & 1971 Pak-India Wars 2010) ^{xxv} (Ibid 2010) ^{xxvi} (Ibid 2010) ^{xxvii} (Britannica 2002) ^{xxviii} (Pakistan. 2010) ^{xxix} (Ahmad 1981) ^{xxx} (Warsi. February, 2017)
- ^{xxxi} (Hanif-ur-Rahman 2012) ^{xxxii} (Ibid 2012)
- ^{xxxiii} (Siddique 2006)
- ^{xxxiv} (Farooq 2014) ^{xxxv} (Ibid 2014) ^{xxxvi} (Ibid 2014) ^{xxxvii} (Secret 1965) ^{xxxviii} (Kamran 2008) ^{xxxix} (Bhutto 1971)

^{xl} (Quddus, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Politics of
 Chrisman.d.) ^{xli} (Rizvi N/A) ^{xlii} (Norris 2005)
^{xliii} (Z. I. Cheema 1986) ^{xliv} (Ibid 1986) ^{xliv}
 (Raza 1997) ^{xlvi} (William Burr 2002) ^{xlvi}
 (Pandey 2012) ^{xlvi} (Wolper 1994)
^{xlix} (M. T. Khan n.d.)
ⁱ (Sarfraz Khan & Noor-Ul-Amin
 2008) ^{li} (Lashari, Bhutto's vision
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